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Introduction
The term ‘settler economies’ refers to a distinctive group of societies formed 
and dominated by white European migrants in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In sharp contrast to the colonial experience of more 
densely populated tropical areas, these temperate-latitude societies were 
clustered near the top of the world income distribution at about 1900. They 
had risen to this status by explosive economic growth over a few decades 
within the nineteenth-century world economy. This was an era of growing 
divergence between rich and poor economies, when most colonial territories 
were on the losing side as components of a global periphery ensnared in 
the ‘Great Divergence’ of the world economy that occurred between about 
1800 and the late twentieth century.1
 On large land areas in the tropics, where pre-existing agrarian societies 
with relatively dense populations were subordinated to colonial rule, and 
where endemic diseases deterred European settlement, colonies of exploitation 
were the norm. Here, exports of high-value commodities were produced by 
large enterprises with an increasingly capitalist character (though in the early 
stages there was widespread use of slave labour, quasi-feudal service tenure, 
and various forms of forced labour). Insofar as those colonies yielded an 
economic surplus, colonial institutions were designed to capture a substantial 
part of that surplus to be transferred to the metropolitan economies, which 
were thus in a sense parasitic on their colonial possessions.
 In the temperate latitudes, pre-colonial populations and societies were 
pushed aside or eliminated to open space for settlement by European 
migrants in a relatively benign disease environment. The resulting ‘settler 
colonies’ dominated North America, Australia, New Zealand and Siberia; 
they formed an important component of South Africa and evolved from 
the previous Spanish colonial regimes in the Southern Cone of South 
America (Argentina, Uruguay and Chile). The characteristic feature of these 
settler colonies, both formal and informal,2 was that they were parasitic on 
the metropolitan economies rather than the other way round. They used 
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economic surplus transferred from the metropolis to build up high-income 
modern economies on the outer geographical fringes of the world system. 
The resulting socio-economic formations have been variously described as 
‘dominion capitalism’3 and ‘settler capitalism’.4
 It is common to distinguish between Hispanic and British settler 
economies. Angus Maddison5 calls settler economies in general ‘neo-
Europes’ with the United States of America (USA), Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand grouped in a subset called ‘Western offshoots’. James Belich6 
classifies the Hispanic Southern Cone countries as ‘adopted dominions’ in 
contrast to the Anglo societies.
 The driving force of the nineteenth-century world economy was British 
industrialization (followed by a sequence of similar industrialization processes 
in Western Europe and the north-eastern USA) but the settler economies were 
not industrial powerhouses. They were engaged primarily in the production 
and export of primary commodities, and their historical distinctiveness lies 
in the fact that they became rich by this route. This experience was not 
repeated until the rise of the Middle Eastern oil economies in the second 
half of the twentieth century.
 Five agrarian export economies of the global periphery – New Zealand, 
Australia, Argentina, Uruguay and Canada – are the ideal-type examples 
of the settler economy model. Three other former colonies dominated by 
European immigrant settlers in the late nineteenth century – South Africa, 
Chile and the USA west of the Appalachians – fit the general pattern, but 
with important qualifications. In Chile and South Africa mining exports 
crowded out agricultural and pastoral ones, resulting in export-enclave 
economic structures and lower per capita incomes than in the agrarian cases; 
while in South Africa white settlers were always a minority exercising control 
over a numerically superior non-white population, leading to a dual society 
and economy. In the USA, the settler-agrarian experience in the nineteenth-
century mid-west was harnessed to an authentic industrial capitalism in the 
northeast within a federal nation-state political unit, with the result that the 
aggregate statistical and historical record is a hybrid.
 These eight economies all shared to varying degrees in what could be 
called the ‘settler economy golden age’ between 1890 and 1930. If the 
United States settler-capitalist economy is considered as restricted to the 
regions west of the Appalachians and Great Lakes, all were peripheral to 
the industrial revolution and geographically far from its central locus, yet 
shared the living standards, political systems and cultures of the global 
core.
 Having converged by 1900, after 1930 the settler economies began to 
diverge again. The USA pulled away to become an industrial superpower, 
while the Hispanic Southern Cone and South Africa fell behind in relative 
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terms. The British dominions – Canada, Australia and New Zealand held 
– together until the 1970s, but thereafter also began to diverge.
 Figure 1, reproduced from Bertram,7 shows those diverging post-1900 
trajectories of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in seven of the 
settler economies (the US was not included in this chart). The question of 
why, having started the century as a closely bunched ‘convergence club’, 
the settler economies then diverged, has attracted substantial literature, 
mostly focused on the reasons for relative ‘failure’ of the Hispanic settler 
economies.
 Writers such as Kirby, Senghaas and Finch9 have drawn attention to 
the greater inequality of landholdings in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America, compared with the prevalence of medium-sized family farms in 
the British dominions and the mid-western USA, and have linked this to 
lower technological dynamism in the Hispanic cases. Others frame the issue 
more widely in terms of greater income inequality in the Hispanic versus 
the Anglo societies,10 or the greater political instability, weaker legitimacy of 
the state, and greater role of the military in politics in the Hispanic realm 
than in the Anglo dominions. Mitchell,11 for example, suggests the Argentine 
state was unable to consolidate an efficient tax system and so faced fiscal 
weakness. Rock12 attributes Argentina’s twentieth century travails to the 
three-century inheritance of Hispanic institutions which, he argues, blocked 
a transition to successful economic diversification and constructive response 
to crises of the export economy; land tenure was only one symptom of 
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the more general issue in this view. Other analysts contrast policy making 
content and effectiveness in the leading and the lagging settler economies 
– particularly during the general era of import-substituting industrialization 
and attempted income redistribution towards labour from 1930 to 1970. At 
this time, Peronism in Argentina and the flagging battlista programme in 
Uruguay contrasted with relatively successful policy performance in the 
British dominions and the USA.
 An alternative line of explanation focuses less on the internal structure 
and dynamics of individual settler societies and more on forces at work in 
the global economy. Bertram13 for example, offers the following account of 
the start of the divergence process:
Convergence among these settler economies ended with the Depression, 
with the 1932 Ottawa conference marking the watershed. At Ottawa 
the British dominions secured a defensive victory for their pastoral 
exports at the expense of the Latin Americans, on the back of which 
they were able to successfully diversify their economies under strong 
democratic institutions over the following three decades. Having held 
their market access, the three British dominions fought with Britain in 
the Second World War, adapted successfully to the Bretton Woods era 
of macroeconomic policy and then pulled away to double their per capita 
income by 1960. The ‘Southern Cone’ countries (Argentina, Uruguay 
and Chile, located in the southern tip of South America) faced export 
market closure in the 1930s, few gains from the Second World War and 
its aftermath, and growing political stresses as economic growth lagged. 
All three had fallen prey to military coups by the mid 1970s. Only at 
the end of the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s did they return to sustained 
growth under democratic institutions. In the interim, the Second World 
War had driven a deep wedge between the British dominions and the 
USA, which had by that time become the global economy’s industrial 
superpower. The three dominions therefore shared a similar trajectory, 
parallel with the USA, until the late 1960s. Thereafter Canada and 
Australia pulled away from New Zealand.
In this account what was specific to the Anglo societies was less their 
domestic institutions and production systems than their degree of integration 
with and political closeness to the dominant world-system power of the time, 
Great Britain. The 1932 Ottawa conference was the high point of British 
Imperial Preference, with the British dominions granted ongoing access to 
the United Kingdom (UK) market for meat, dairy products and wool while 
the Hispanic Southern Cone economies were subjected to quotas.
 This approach frames the differential impact on settler economies of 
the Great Depression in terms of whether each society’s nineteenth-century 
Comparative Analysis of Settler Colonies
15
history had been one of formal or informal incorporation into the British 
Empire. However, it probably abstracts too much from the particular domestic 
forces and histories of the societies under consideration. British preference 
for the dominions over the Southern Cone was not simply a matter of 
sentiment; it acknowledged the strengths of the dominions as technologically 
progressive export producers and hard bargainers at the conference table.
 To understand how shifting conjunctures in the world system produce 
differing outcomes for particular societies on the global periphery, it is 
necessary to trace the interaction of internal and external dynamics case 
by case. Global conjunctural forces sometimes were strong enough to fully 
determine synchronized outcomes across all the settler economies, but 
at other times came to bear selectively, or were too weak to counteract 
individual societies’ internal dynamics, historical legacies and policy 
environments. Dependent development was (and is) a two-sided, not a one-
sided, process.
Convergence and divergence in economic theory
Mainstream economics, including modern growth theory, is prone to a 
particularly strong and deterministic view of the evolution of the world 
economic system. In the long run, all economies are predicted to converge 
to the technology and income level of the most advanced. This follows 
from the logic of competitive market forces. Labour, capital and technology 
should flow, in response to economic incentives, to where they can earn the 
highest returns, and this process should equalize the return to each factor 
of production, at the margin, across the world economy. Similarly, under 
competitive conditions, goods and services will tend to be produced and 
exchanged according to comparative advantage, and this also should tend 
to equalize factor prices, hence incomes, across the world system.14 These 
propositions were familiar to the Classical economists of the nineteenth 
century: Ricardo (1814) 15 worked out the implications of equalization of the 
profit rate across sectors, and (1817)16 developed the theory of comparative 
advantage. The international prediction of factor price equalization through 
the operation of market forces was clearly stated by Ricardo’s follower John 
Stuart Mill:
If to carry consumable goods from the places where they are 
superabundant to those where they are scarce, is a good pecuniary 
speculation, is it not an equally good speculation to do the same thing 
with regard to labour and instruments? The exportation of labourers and 
capital from old to new countries, from a place where their productive 
power is less, to a place where it is greater, increases by so much the 
aggregate produce of the labour and capital of the world. It adds to the 
joint wealth of the old and the new country, what amounts in a short 
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period to many times the mere cost of effecting the transport. There 
needs be no hesitation in affirming that Colonization, in the present state 
of the world, is the best affair of business.17
Ricardo’s other great successor economist, Karl Marx, also saw equalization 
of the profit rate as a fundamental driver in unifying the word as a single 
capitalist system:
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the 
bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, 
settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. . . . The bourgeoisie, 
by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the 
immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most 
barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are 
the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, . . . It 
compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode 
of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into 
their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates 
a world after its own image.18
Marx, however, left open the issue of whether global equalization of rates 
of return to factors of production other than capital would occur, given the 
active agency of capitalist elites in using institutional mechanisms and state 
power to shape emerging production systems in favour of capital, and more 
particularly in favour of metropolitan capital. The Anglo settler economies 
attracted Marx’s attention precisely because of the inability of metropolitan 
capital to keep migrant labour on the Anglo frontier separated from land and 
hence to equalize the ‘rate of exploitation’ between core and periphery in 
these cases. Elsewhere in the colonial realm, production relations were more 
successfully skewed against labour by slavery, tax and land policies, and 
the successful use of force. In Marx’s analytical approach, the institutional 
setup of global and local labour markets dictated which modes of production 
became established on the periphery, and hence (potentially) the long-run 
global distribution of income. Neither convergence nor divergence of income 
levels across countries was preordained in this framework. Marx thus left 
something of an analytical vacuum to be addressed a century later by Baran19 
and then by dependency and world-system theorists.
 Returning to mainstream economic theory, the expectation that market 
forces must tend to equalize the distribution of income across the world 
economy has remained strong. The standard Solow20 neoclassical growth 
model predicts that in a world with a uniform technology, operation of 
market forces should tend to make all economies converge to long-run 
steady-state levels of relative income per capita, which should differ only 
insofar as savings rates and population growth rates differ. The apparent 
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failure of international factor markets to exhibit strong convergence presents 
a theoretical ‘puzzle’ to which only ad hoc empirical solutions seem to be 
available within the neoclassical paradigm.21
 Economic historians have long been conscious of the fact that the past 
two centuries have witnessed divergence rather than convergence between 
core and periphery,22 but have mostly stuck with the intuitive expectation that 
in the long run ‘catch up’ will be the norm.23 Rostow24 formulated a model 
in which, one after another, individual economies break free of ‘tradition’ 
and enter upon rapid growth to catch up to US living standards. Lucas25 
presented the catch-up story in modern mathematical form, with the same 
predicted outcome. Divergence in this view is simply a temporary historical 
phase; if we wait long enough, all economies must in due course catch up 
and settle in a converged group with differences attributable only to savings 
and demographics. The recent rise of China and India, and signs of catch 
up by sub-Saharan Africa, fit this story.
 The difficult issue for the mainstream paradigm is to identify the factors 
which hold economies back from taking off and catching up. Typically 
the literature appeals to retarding elements in the backward economies 
– traditional attitudes, obstructive institutions, corruption, monopoly, in 
short what economists call ‘market imperfections’; the removal of which 
should clear the way for more rapid growth. In this context, a puzzle for 
the mainstream is the empirical evidence of continuing divergence in the 
half century since decolonization and the rise of globalization, which might 
have been expected to remove or reduce the market imperfections inherent 
in colonial rule.
 The empirical fact of divergence rather than convergence left the way open 
for an alternative theoretical approach to global development, emphasizing the 
long-run division of the world economy between an industrializing capitalist 
core and a periphery of less developed economies held in an essentially 
dependent relationship to the core. From dependency theory in the 1960 
and 1970s, this approach evolved into world-system theory in the 1970s and 
1980s. Rather than seeking explanations for the relative backwardness of the 
periphery in terms of social structures, institutions and national histories 
of the periphery countries, the world-systems approach started from the 
notion of an international division of labour in which subordinate roles are 
assigned to periphery economies by the system, not by their own merits 
or demerits. In the hands of writers, such as Wallerstein and Amin, this 
tended to become a story of rich core and poor periphery, with the unequal 
distribution of the global product attributed to the capitalist system itself.
 The great attraction of this position was that it rejected the idea of a 
universal, unique evolutionary path that all economies must follow through 
time, terminating in a converged world after all have caught up. Dependency 
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theory argued that the logic of the international division of labour, in a world 
where capital accumulation was driven from the core, was one of unequal 
exchange and divergent outcomes for income per capita. Underdevelopment 
itself was modelled as an outcome of the dependent-development process 
rather than a simple failure to develop. World-systems theory sought 
to identify the processes through which the evolving world division of 
labour was able to create and then reproduce inequality across the global 
economy.
 The country-by-country detail, however, revealed difficulties for any 
dependency and world-systems formulations that hoped to abstract completely 
from national considerations and attribute the periphery economies’ condition 
entirely to their peripheral status. Senghaas’26 systematic comparative 
review of the economic histories of the periphery made clear the need to 
acknowledge the significance of genuine agency within each peripheral 
society as it engaged with the wider global system. In the process, Senghaas 
reduced the scope for deterministic outcomes to flow from the global division 
of labour on its own.
 Equally problematic was the issue of where the settler economies fitted 
into a world-system scheme of analysis, given their geographic location on 
the periphery yet their resemblance to the core in terms of incomes and 
culture. Senghaas placed distant peripheral economies, such as New Zealand, 
into the same analytical categories as smaller European economies such 
as Denmark, implicitly locating them within the world core regardless of 
geography. But just reclassifying rich economies out of the periphery and 
into the core did harm rather than good to world-systems generalizations 
about the necessary consequences of peripheral status.
 Denoon treated the settler economies as a distinct category, neither core 
nor periphery, characterizing ‘settler capitalism’ as a special process of 
dependent development and toying with the issue of whether the economies 
possessed a distinctive mode of production:
[S]ettler societies possessed a dynamic that differed from that of most 
of the tropical world, where dense agricultural populations survived the 
colonial intrusion. Equally, they differed from the metropolitan societies 
from which they derived. . . . In a preliminary way, it is proposed that 
these societies practised a mode of production to be termed ‘settler 
capitalism.’27
Denoon’s descriptive list28 of seven characteristic features of his settler 
capitalisms, however, fell short of amounting to a mode of production in the 
traditional sense, as he himself acknowledged. The list, in summary, was:
• Each society began as a garrison-outpost of one European empire or 
another;
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• There was no exploitable indigenous community strong enough to sustain 
a stratum of conquering settlers, so pre-existing modes of production were 
replaced by the settler influx;
• High land-labour ratios led to early adoption of frontier pastoralism, whose 
needs determined the rest of the economic structure;
• Heavy reliance on inflows of labour and capital did not translate to 
subservience to Britain in political matters;
• Political relative autonomy did not result in economic diversification; rather 
to ‘unforced dependence’ upon the export of a few specialized staples;
• This specialization went hand in hand with both radical institutional 
innovation and ruthless suppression of dissent from the ruling model;
• The demise of peasantry was ‘more abrupt . . . than occurred in ost other 
parts of the world’.
Only slightly better focused was the development by Ehrensaft and 
Armstrong29 of their ‘dominion capitalism’ model which summarized the 
features of the settler economies and, in the process, singled them out as 
a special case. In the process, the deterministic identification of dependent 
development with income divergence had to be set aside. World systems 
analysis was thus made more realistic, but less clear in its predictions. Global 
forces working through the capitalist market system remained the central 
focus, but a range of essentially ad hoc devices were required to explain 
the detail of real-world history.
 In this situation, it is worth looking again at episodes of actual convergence 
and divergence, in the hope of clarifying the balance of explanation amongst 
global forces operating regardless of national circumstances, national or 
local agency in the face of the challenges and opportunities thrown up by 
the evolving world system and elements of path-dependence in the histories 
of countries and regions.
 There are some well-known cases. Most celebrated are the convergence 
processes amongst states within the USA and prefectures in Japan over 
the past two centuries, and amongst the OECD economies since World 
War II.30 Cashin31 found evidence of convergence across the colonies of 
Australasia (including New Zealand) during the nineteenth century when 
they were closely linked together, replaced by divergence in the twentieth 
century. Greasley and Oxley32 concur. Perhaps especially relevant in the 
context of a discussion of settler economies, there is evidence from small-
island economies around the world of economic convergence of ‘dependent’ 
entities to the income levels of their metropolitan ‘patrons’ – a convergence 
that is dramatically weakened by sovereign independence and strengthened 
by political integration with the patron.33
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 Using Maddison’s long-run dataset, Figure 2 shows the per capita GDP 
of the eight settler economies relative to that of the UK (the core of 
the nineteenth-century world system). The picture speaks for itself. The 
nineteenth century started with the economies widely dispersed and on 
divergent trajectories, so far as can be estimated. In 1820 we see New 
Zealand at the bottom, with Maddison’s subsistence level of $400 per year 
per capita; Australia a little above that due to its early settlement; the Iberian 
economies of the Latin American Southern Cone probably a little higher 
(though Maddison’s data for them does not extend back before 1870); Canada 
higher again; and the USA heading the group with a per capita income 
already three-quarters the British level, as the north-east industrialized. 
There is then a radical convergence of Australia and New Zealand to equal 
Britain by the 1870s, followed by a somewhat later surge first by Uruguay 
(hard to date in the absence of data) and then in concert in the 1890s by 
Canada, Argentina, and Chile (Maddison’s GDP data for South Africa were 
too sparse to include it in this chart).
 For four decades from the 1890s the convergence outcome held, with 
the Iberian cases apparently settling to a lower steady state than the Anglo 
ones. Then the glue failed and the economies began to drift apart again. 
The USA pushed on to economic superpower status; Canada and Australia 
consolidated their position just above the UK from 1950 on; New Zealand 
stayed with those two until the 1960s, then began to drift down; the Iberian 
settler economies were all on a divergent track from the late 1930s.
 Outside that golden age of 1890-1930, Figure 2 seems to suggest that 
the seven economies have been on long-run divergent tracks for the past 
two or three centuries, interrupted by the remarkable convergence at the 
end of the nineteenth century. It is as though a corset had suddenly been 
tightened around the group, pulling them together into a narrow corridor 
in which they were held until the Great Depression. Then the corset was 
released and the economies slumped back onto their long-run paths. The 
implication would seem to be that world-system convergence dynamics do not 
apply consistently over the long haul and, indeed, that in the long run, the 
trajectories of individual economies are largely determined by factors specific 
to each economy, subject to global market forces and technological trends 
that may be sufficient to generate underlying ‘conditional convergence’ but 
are not strong enough to prevail in absolute terms. Only at certain historical 
moments, for certain groups of economies, do world-system forces strengthen 
to the point where they overwhelm the divergent tendencies imparted by 
national characteristics and path dependence. The settler capitalist economies 
exhibit, therefore, first their own great convergence, then a stable converged 
‘golden age’, and then a great divergence. These three periods frame the 
discussion in the remainder of the paper.
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Nineteenth-century convergence
As noted at the outset, what was distinctive about the settler economies 
was that they rode the nineteenth-century upswing of the winning side of 
the global great divergence without an internal dynamic approximating the 
industrial revolution in the core of the capitalist world system. In one simple 
version of the story, they were like carriages in an export-led train, pulled 
along behind the capitalist locomotive of the British economy and (to a 
lesser extent) the other components of the world-system core. The crucial 
linkage was provided by exports of the great staples – wheat, wool, meat, 
dairy products – produced by migrant settler communities transplanted into 
land-abundant open space on the geographic periphery, mainly from Britain 
but also from other European labour exporters including Scandinavia, Italy 
and Spain.35
 It is true that the export-driven staples story fits well the structure and 
dynamics of settler economies between 1890 and 1930, when the agrarian 
five – New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Canada – provided 
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classic examples of successful export-led development. But the process of 
mass migration to high-income areas of settlement had been well underway 
– at least in the Anglo world – for some decades prior to the emergence and 
consolidation of the export-led model, as Belich36 has recently documented 
in detail, following in the footsteps of Denoon,37 Taylor and Williamson38 
and others.
 It is necessary therefore to distinguish between the initial emergence 
of settler socioeconomic formations on the periphery, and the subsequent 
discovery that these formations, once established, were well adapted to 
servicing the booming demand for staples export supply that emerged in the 
world system of the later nineteenth century. One can think of the settler 
story in terms of economic response to two successive, and separable, market 
openings.
Stage One: Factor market opening, mass migration, and the 
mode of production in the colonies
What happened in the first stage was the opening to European (especially 
British) peoples of a key offshore factor market for land. Falling transportation 
costs combined with physical access to relatively sparsely populated land-
abundant spaces whose indigenous inhabitants had been, or were in the 
process of being, cleared out of the way by military might and European 
diseases, triggered massive migration of both capital and labour, which were 
in surplus supply relative to scarce land within Britain. The mass migration 
process was underway by the late 1820s and gathered momentum over the 
following half-century. Its logic was the logic of mainstream economic 
theory and factor-price equalization: the mobile factors, land and capital, 
moved to combine with the immobile factor, land.
 In Belich’s account (Chapters 5-6) 39 the crucial settler dynamic began 
with the emergence of what he terms ‘explosive colonization’ – the mass 
transfer of migrants from metropolis to periphery. Schemes of industrial-scale 
colonization date from the 1820s and 1830s and were driven as much from 
below (the emergence of a mass willingness and desire to emigrate) as from 
above (the entrepreneurs and their ‘booster industry’). Substantial numbers 
of migrants had moved to the far ends of the earth before the emergence 
of any clearly-defined market demand for staples that they might produce 
for export back to the metropolis. The settler notion of ‘little Englands’ was 
not a prediction of the emergence of staple-export economies.
 The motivating force for migration in this early stage seems to have been 
the desire of individuals to better themselves and their families. The lands 
of new settlement held out initially the hope of self-sufficiency at a good 
standard of living without the need to enter into an exploitative wage-labour 
relation: an upwards escape for working-class people from the constraints 
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of the emerging capitalist mode of production in Britain. The escape was 
feasible physically because of British political and military hegemony over 
land-abundant temperate zones of the globe where the disease risk was 
relatively low. It became feasible economically when ocean transportation 
rates fell for migrants – partly because of technical advances, partly because 
of the need of whalers, and shippers of other extractive-industry products 
from the far periphery, to find back-loads for their ships, and partly because 
of the availability of direct fare subsidies from colonizing interests in 
Britain.
 The fact that Belich’s explosive colonization preceded, chronologically, 
the emergence of well-defined markets for export staples produced in the 
periphery is important. In place of explanations that start from the growing 
metropolitan demand for food and raw materials as the industrial revolution 
took off, and then account for settler capitalism as a process driven from 
the imperial demand side by export prospects, the evidence points to a 
process driven more on the supply side of the British economy: escape 
from poverty and exploitation in the metropolitan labour market by exit 
from the metropolis itself, as soon as a viable escape hatch opened. As the 
nineteenth century progressed, demand-side forces progressively asserted 
themselves and reinforced the mass migration, but they do not account for 
its initial take-off.
 As Taylor and Williamson note,40
The convergence power of free migration, when it is tolerated, is likely 
to be substantial given the late nineteenth-century evidence. Cheap 
labour did not wait for foreign capital to seek it out; it did not ignore 
distant immobile natural resources that beckoned it to move; it did not 
wait for human capital accumulation or spillovers to initiate catching up 
at home; it just went in search of higher wages elsewhere. Convergence 
explanations based on technological or accumulation forces in closed-
economy models miss this point. The millions on the move in the late 
nineteenth century did not.
The migrant settlers had, thus, a substantial degree of autonomy and agency. 
This accounts for several of the features often noted in settler-economy 
accounts: a degree of self-conscious independence from metropolitan 
dictation in policy and constitutional matters, a willingness to experiment 
with institutional innovations (including, for example, partial welfare-states 
in the early twentieth century in societies as otherwise divergent as New 
Zealand and Uruguay); and wherever possible, the pursuit of self-sufficiency 
and self-employment in preference to fully-capitalist wage labour.
 When seen as a static matter of resource allocation, the mass migrations 
of the nineteenth century were a one-off process of market equilibration, 
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which would be expected to proceed until the returns at the margin to land, 
labour and capital had been equalized across the world market system. There 
was more to it than that, in several ways. Firstly, the settler process was 
not simply a static resource reallocation. It involved dynamic and structural 
developments which would run through at least the following century. 
Second, so long as population growth rates and savings rates continued to 
differ from country to country, new opportunities for profitable transnational 
relocation of capital and labour would be continuously reproduced over time, 
so that final equilibrium was always a moving target. Finally, global factor 
markets could perform their full equilibrating function only so long as 
they operated in a reasonably unconstrained market environment. From the 
First World War onwards, both labour movement and capital flows became 
subject to increasingly stringent restrictions, which reversed the great market 
opening of the nineteenth century and foreclosed the theoretically-possible 
further equalization of incomes across the world economy by means of 
factor movements.
 In terms of economic structure and dynamics, the settler-mass-migration 
era in the mid-nineteenth century saw the emergence of frontier economies 
in which the ‘mode of production’ was not a simple transplant of the social 
relations prevailing in the capitalist core. Migrant settlers brought with them 
the education levels, technology and aspirations for income and social justice, 
of their source countries, and were motivated to move by the perceived 
opportunity to secure better returns on those human-capital assets, as well 
as on their raw labour power. Once arrived, they were in an environment 
where the opportunity cost of their labour power was measured in terms of 
the level of income they could secure as self-employed agricultural operators. 
The resulting market wage rate, measured in terms of consumable wage 
goods, was far above the market wage back in the core economies, where 
land scarcity continually tended to push up wage-goods prices, and capitalist 
wage-labour relations of production had to be accepted as the best deal on 
offer for landless workers.
 The relative abundance of land on the new frontiers produced a distinctive 
institutional setup in agriculture wherever an institutional framework to 
monopolize land had not been entrenched before the settlers arrived. In 
Chapter 33 of Volume One of Capital, Marx, 41 criticizing Wakefield’s 
colonization schemes, saw clearly how the equilibrium migrant income 
would be determined on a frontier where land access was unrestrained, and 
the implication for the labour market:
In Western Europe . . . the capitalist regime has either directly 
subordinated to itself the whole of the nation’s production, or, where 
economic conditions are less developed, it has at least indirect control 
of those social layers which, though they belong to the antiquated 
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mode of production, still continue to exist side by side with it in a 
state of decay . . . It is otherwise in the [settler] colonies. There the 
capitalist regime constantly comes up against the obstacle presented by 
the producer, who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs 
that labour to enrich himself instead of the capitalist. The contradiction 
of these two diametrically opposed economic systems, manifests itself 
here practically in a struggle between them. . . . A Mr. Peel . . . took 
with him from England to the Swan River district of Western Australia 
means of subsistence and of production to the amount of £50,000. Mr. 
Peel even had the foresight to bring with him, besides, 3000 persons 
of the working class, men, women, and children. Once arrived at his 
destination, ‘Mr. Peel was left without a servant to make his bed or 
fetch him water from the river.’ Unhappy Mr. Peel, who provided for 
everything except the export of English modes of production to Swan 
River! . . . The expropriation of the mass of people from the soil forms 
the basis of the capitalist mode of production. The essence of a free 
colony . . . consists in this, that the bulk of the soil is still public property, 
and every settler on it can therefore turn part of it into his private 
property and his individual means of production, without preventing 
later settlers from performing the same operation. This is the secret of 
. . . the prosperity of the colonies. . . . In the colonies . . . the absolute 
numbers of the population increase much more quickly than in the mother 
country, because many workers enter the colonial world as ready-made 
adults, and still the labour market is always understocked . . . Today’s 
wage labourer is tomorrow’s independent peasant or artisan, working 
for himself . . . [As a result] the degree of exploitation of wage-labour 
remain[s] indecently low.
Marx correctly foresaw the high-wage environment that was implied by the 
combination of abundant land and settler access to possession and use of that 
land, but he did not foresee that the migrant settler, once emancipated by 
access to abundant land, would rise above the status of artisan or peasant. 
What emerged instead of a peasantry, wherever local institutions allowed, 
was the family farm as a key agricultural producing unit.
 The family farm, established by literate migrants with experience of 
industrial capitalism and of free markets, was (and is) non-capitalist in the 
essential sense that it organizes its labour force by non-wage incentives. 
But it is different from the usual conception of a peasant enterprise in the 
totality of its commitment to specialization, and in its reliance on the sale of 
specialized output on commercial markets for all or most of its income, with 
subsistence production relegated to marginal importance. In settler economies 
it emerged as an economically efficient means of recruiting, holding and 
managing the agricultural or pastoral labour force. Once established, the 
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family farm was able for most of the twentieth century to hold its own against 
competition from capitalistically-organized corporate farming. In Australia, 
New Zealand, the USA and Canada the family farm proved capable of rapid 
technical change, dynamic investment performance, and radical institutional 
innovation on the boundary where the non-capitalist production mode was 
articulated with the wider capitalist world. Marx underestimated the extent 
to which a petty-bourgeoisie could be technologically progressive.
 Not all the settler economies, however, had the family farm at the centre 
of the relations of production in agriculture. In all settler societies, the 
second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a confrontation between 
two alternative production systems: great estates and owner-operated family 
farms. Marx had been correct in predicting that if it were possible to separate 
the mass of settlers from access to land, and thereby force them into seeking 
employment from a group which held a monopoly of the non-labour means 
of production (land and capital), then the evolution of economic structure 
would take a different course. In the British colonies of settlement, as already 
noted, land had not been successfully locked up prior to the arrival of the 
settlers, and any attempt in one colony to restrict access to new land, or to 
put a heavy price on it as a means of extracting surplus from the settlers, 
would simply cause the migration flow to divert to other Anglo societies 
where no such constraints applied. The settler process thus proceeded under 
workably competitive conditions. Political pressure from the established 
family-farmer class for the breakup of large estates as a means of making 
more land available for intensive settlement then drove Anglo policy.
 But Marx did not study the Hispanic settler economies, where access 
to land for the mass of migrants was foreclosed by pre-existence of large 
estates and control of politics by elites entrenched during three centuries 
of colonial rule by Spain. Hence he did not draw the contrast between the 
outcome of frontier settlement under permissive Anglo institutions and the 
very different rural societies of Uruguay and Argentina.
 The settlement of the pampas of Argentina and Uruguay began with the 
assertion of property rights over large areas of land, initially by caudillos 
with mini-armies of followers, leaving the estancia as the main form of 
rural property by the nineteenth century. Land ownership was formally 
enforced in the 1860s and 1870s by wire fencing (effectively, an enclosure 
process reminiscent of what had earlier happened in Britain).42 In Argentina, 
the wool boom of the 1850s was driven by immigrants but did not lead 
to the emergence of a class of independent owner-farmers; on the contrary 
most sheep farmers were tenants, and government policies on the sale of 
large land blocks under presidents from Rosas on led to consolidation of 
the latifundio (great estate) as the dominant rural institution at the same 
time as immigration intensified.43 As Rock summarizes the situation, 
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‘European immigrants to Argentina were . . . welcomed as farmers, but 
found themselves increasingly enjoined from land ownership.’ 44
 Instead, migrants became sharecroppers, tenants, shepherds, or seasonal 
labourers – or joined the urban labour force as artisans or wage workers.45 
Political pressure to break up large estates was as present in the Southern 
Cone as it was in the Anglo settler colonies, but it was unsuccessful. Wire 
fencing – the main technology for enclosure in settler economies – defined 
and protected migrants’ family landholdings in the Anglo societies, but 
excluded migrants in the Hispanic Southern Cone.
 Some of the first migrant wave to the Southern Cone in mid-century 
did manage to secure landholdings in areas such as the littoral of Uruguay, 
where they formed a (relatively) progressive class of pastoralists, but the 
interior of the pampas was locked into a large-landholding regime which 
was able to dictate terms to labour in a way that was not possible in the 
British dominions. This premature institutional closure of the land frontier 
condemned most migrants to wage labour or tenant status.
 When meat exports boomed at the end of the nineteenth century in 
Argentina and Uruguay, the rural mode of production was non-capitalist in 
a completely different sense from that of dominion capitalism. In place of 
the family farm production system, the latifundio-minifundio system had 
been reproduced from elsewhere in Latin America. As technical change 
became increasingly important for agricultural and pastoral productivity 
growth in the twentieth century, the comparative performance of the two 
modes of production diverged markedly, as numerous commentators have 
remarked.46
 The implication of this for convergence and divergence is that convergence 
in per capita income across countries by means of direct factor-price 
equalization, driven by international movement of labour and capital, 
depended on competitive conditions in the market for land. Therefore we 
could expect to see more evidence of convergence to the world core in the 
British colonies than in the Iberian settler economies.
Stage Two: The staples export boom: trade-driven 
convergence
The second great convergence force that can potentially drive factor-price 
equalization across the world system is commodity trade. Once processing 
and transportation technology advanced to the point where British consumers 
of wheat, meat, wool and dairy products could be supplied cost-effectively 
from the periphery, the settler economies found themselves located inside 
the extensive margin of wage-goods agriculture in the world core (Britain). 
In the technologically progressive cases, rapid adoption of productivity-
raising innovations placed settler producers inside the intensive margin as 
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well. Both margins were located in Europe, where the prices of staples 
were set by the marginal product of capital and labour in home agriculture. 
Ricardian rents from the sale of staples at those prices flowed out to the 
settler economies, where they accrued to whichever groups had secured 
appropriation rights. Economic surplus flowed into settler economies, not 
out, making them in a sense ‘exploiters’ of the metropolis, not exploited by 
it. Here lies the key difference between the settler colonies and the tropical 
colonies of exploitation.
 In terms of the economic theory of convergence, a set of export-driven 
economies selling the same commodities into a common core market at 
prices that yield Ricardian rents should tend to converge to a common level 
of per capita income, subject to two disturbing factors: the level of technology 
in staples production, and the institutional framework for domestic income 
distribution and resource allocation. With greater inequality in resource 
ownership and less aptitude for progressive technological innovation, the 
Hispanic settler economies could be expected to converge to a somewhat 
lower level than the dominion capitalisms, and this indeed seems to be what 
we can see in the data.
 Belich47 describes the export-led boom process as ‘recolonization’, and 
argues that settler dynamics involve well-defined stages that in some sense 
follow a logical sequence: first the boom of explosive colonization, then 
the bust as speculative bubbles collapse and intense pressure is put on 
the settlers’ aspirations to high living standards, then a settler response in 
terms of ‘export rescue’ – the production of bulk staples for sale in outside 
markets, which provides a secure economic footing for the mature settler 
economy. But there is too much synchronicity in the great staples booms of 
the late nineteenth century to attribute them only to the internal dynamics 
of settler colonization. The world market for staple food and raw materials 
from the mid-nineteenth century was driven by the British economy. Without 
that world-system dimension, busted settler societies would have been faced 
with the need to rely on their own internal economic dynamics, which could 
not have produced the converged high-income success stories of 1900 (The 
exception to prove the rule is, of course, the USA, which indeed had its own 
internal capitalist dynamic and which had integrated its internal national 
market as effectively as Britain had integrated the global marketplace).
The settler-economy golden age, 1890-1930
Once established, the income relativities among the settler economies and 
between them and Britain have the appearance of a steady state lasting for 
three or four decades. Because there were increasing constraints on migration 
after 1914, it seems plausible that it was trade more than factor movements 
that played the key stabilizing role.
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 During this period the sheer driving power of the staple-export sectors 
was extraordinary and opened up for all the settler societies the opportunity 
for innovative institutional and social reform. So long as the large rents from 
exports could be successfully recycled through the settler economy and 
society, they could sustain a raft of non-export activities and services, while 
providing the tax base for substantial redistributive institutions – ‘battlismo’ 
in Uruguay, and the nascent welfare state in Australia and New Zealand. 
A key structural feature of the rent-recycling process was the transmission 
channel through which rents entered the wider economy. In family-farm 
settler economies, the rents came into the hands of a relatively numerous 
and widely-dispersed class of independent farmers with a high propensity 
to spend on wage goods, services and inputs with a high local content, 
resulting in a relatively strong export multiplier for the local economy. In 
the Hispanic settler economies export rents tended to accrue to a narrower 
group with higher import propensities, so that the economy-wide income 
level sustained by a given volume of exports tended to be lower, and the 
potential importance of the state as an institutional mechanism to capture 
and allocate surplus was therefore greater. Largely for historic reasons, 
however, the Hispanic state tended to be weaker and less well-adapted for 
this purpose, partly because of the greater claim by the military on fiscal 
resources and partly because of the colonial heritage which weakened tax 
compliance and design.
 Both Uruguay and New Zealand gained reputations as ‘social laboratories’ 
around the turn of the twentieth century,48 and as Lloyd49 observes of 
Australia,
The great wealth that flowed from rich primary exports underpinned [a] 
constitutional class compromise. Thus it was not despite but because of 
being a settler capitalist society that a social-democratic compromise 
could be developed and become so entrenched in the [subsequent] era of 
nascent industrialization. In turn, more or less complete industrialization 
was made possible by the central role of the social democratic state.
The two areas in which policy innovation related to export success was 
most obvious were the capture and redistribution of the economic surplus 
flowing from agrarian exports, and the development of institutional means 
of accelerating technological progress in the interests of greater productivity 
(and hence larger surplus). Farmer co-operatives, agricultural extension 
services, training schemes, technically-oriented publications for a literate 
farmer readership, and state involvement in the organization of single-desk 
marketing channels, were all common.
 It was tight integration with the British market for agricultural and pastoral 
commodities that dragged all the settler economies, Hispanic as well as 
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Anglo, into a common high-income band. For three or four decades the 
convergence forces held, during what could be termed the ‘settler economy 
moment’ of history. Then they let go, as the Great Depression and rising 
settler production collided to create gluts and falling prices in the UK market 
for meat, dairy products and wool. Suddenly the various settler countries 
were at loggerheads, competing to hold their places in an oversupplied 
market – a competition in which the British dominions came out on top 
at the Ottawa conference in 1932. The drama of Ottawa throws into stark 
relief a key feature of the preceding golden age, namely the relative lack 
of self-conscious competition amongst the settler economies prior to the 
Depression. Policy debates in New Zealand over Imperial Preference during 
the 1920s, for example, were dominated by the issue of non-British imports 
(especially Japanese goods) – not by competition for export markets. The 
settler economies were more like a co-operative cartel of suppliers to the 
booming UK market than a keenly-competing supply side. The bonanza, 
basically, was big enough to feed them all, and there was a great deal of 
mutual exchange of technical information and skilled labour amongst the 
settler economies, with the Hispanics fully incorporated into the information 
and factor-exchange networks. The onset of world market gluts broke these 
linkages and set the various countries onto separate paths.
The great settler divergence
There are five standard explanations for the parting of the ways among the 
settler economies after 1930:
• First is the different extent of progress in industrialization during the age 
of policy-driven import-substitution, 1930-1975. The USA was by 1930 
already an established industrial power with a large enough domestic 
market to sustain heavy industry on a large scale, and the Second World 
War triggered a steep change in the level of US GDP relative to the rest 
(and to the UK). Among the other settler economies the ability to sustain 
an import-substituting industrialization programme was always constrained 
by the availability of export rents that could be redistributed via industrial 
wages and welfare-state arrangements. This was conditioned by export 
market access, by the effectiveness of policymaking, and by productivity 
and profitability in the export sectors. The Anglo economies secured a 
higher level of ongoing export rents, apparently more effective policy, 
and a more rapid rate of technical progress than the Hispanic economies, 
which accounts for the gradual widening of the gap during the 1950s and 
1960s.
• Second, on the export front, the Great Depression brought far greater 
damage for Uruguayan and Argentine exports than for the British 
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dominions because of the latter’s ability to use Imperial Preference in their 
favour. At Ottawa, the political dimension of the world system abruptly 
came to the fore as Britain protected the access to its markets for meat 
and dairy products from the dominions and shut the Iberians out, apart 
from the beef quota allowed to Argentina under the 1933 Roca-Runciman 
pact. A similar negative trade shock struck New Zealand half a century 
later when Britain entered the European Economic Community.
• Third is the different institutional situation in the Anglo countries versus 
the Hispanic. In part, this was a matter of the legitimacy of government 
itself and hence its ability to implement effective policy, collect taxes and 
mediate social conflict.50 In part, it reflected different traditions between 
Hispanic and Anglo societies in matters such as political patronage and 
administrative practice. In part, it may also relate to the far greater 
political role of the military in Iberian as compared to Anglo settler 
states – notwithstanding the fact that the USA carries the largest and 
most costly military establishment of the eight.
• Fourth is the role of agrarian structure – the distribution of land and the 
strength of modernizing entrepreneurial groups in the sectors supplying 
staple export commodities. While modernizing elites are found in all the 
settler economies, they were more strongly evident in the Anglo economies 
than the Hispanics, with the result that agricultural productivity in the 
latter tended to lag – and with it the export rents.
• Fifth is the general issue of policy choices made by the ruling elites in 
the various settler economies. With hindsight it is common to criticize 
the detailed policies of, say, peronismo in Argentina as an ‘explanation’ 
for slower growth; but it can always be argued that the historic failure 
of peronismo was due as much to the fading momentum of Argentina’s 
export economy, and consequent shrinkage of economic surplus relative 
to population. From the 1970s on, all of the settler societies were 
conspicuous for their radical and ruthless adoption of neoliberal ideology 
– under authoritarian military control following the coups of 1973-5 in 
Uruguay, Chile and Argentina – but in no case did neoliberalism provide 
a growth panacea nor result in any revival of convergence amongst the 
economies.
All of these proposed lines of explanation suffer from the common failing 
that they look at relatively superficial proximate causes rather than at deep 
causes of long-run economic performance. Looking back to Figure 2, 
there seems to be a case for regarding the convergence process and the 
converged ‘golden age’ as an historical aberration – a temporary departure 
from divergent long-run growth paths which were already established by 
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the middle of the nineteenth century. If this view is sustained, then the 
post-1930 divergence is not a puzzle at all, but simply the re-emergence of 
long-run trajectories that had been submerged or suppressed for four or five 
decades by world-system forces, but which reasserted themselves once the 
focus of the world system shifted in the Great Depression.
Conclusion
An important conclusion to emerge from this discussion is that the world 
system does embody strong convergence forces, which operate as mainstream 
theory suggests (through factor movements and international markets for 
traded goods), but that these forces are the dominant determinants of 
outcomes only in particular contingent situations (conjunctures). From time 
to time, global market forces throw up a ‘convergence club’ of countries 
that happen to share in some attribute or set of attributes that draw them 
through a convergence funnel into a corridor or ‘corset’ that can persist 
for some decades until a shift in the global conjuncture unlaces the corset, 
commonly in a dramatic event such as the Great Depression. The economies 
in the club then return to divergent growth paths based on longer-run historic 
trends rooted in the distant past, in response to forces operating over the 
very long run and inherent in the histories of individual economies and 
societies. World-system convergence forces, in other words, are powerful 
when they operate – but historically contingent as to when they operate 
on any particular set of economies, and always countervailed by historical 
path-dependence.
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